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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
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by 
Jorge Enrique Cartaya 
Florida International University, 2017 
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Ana Luszczynska, Co-Major Professor  
Heather Russell, Co-Major Professor 
This thesis grapples with questions surrounding representation, mourning, and 
responsibility in relation to two literary representations of the ZONG massacre of 1781. 
These texts are M. NourbeSe Philip’s ZONG! and Fred D’Aguiar’s FEEDING THE 
GHOSTS. The only extant archival document—a record of the insurance dispute which 
ensued as a consequence of the massacre—does not represent the drowned as victims, nor 
can it represent the magnitude of the atrocity. As such, this thesis posits that the archival 
gaps or silences from which the captives’ voices are missing become spaces of possibility 
for additive representation. This thesis also examines the role voice and sound play in 
these literary texts and the deconstructive-ethical philosophies of Jean-Luc Nancy and 
Jacques Derrida. This thesis argues that these texts invoke the sonic materiality of voice 
in the service of responding to the disremembered dead through mourning and 
acknowledgment. 
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Introduction: 
Listening/Reading for Disremembered Voices: Additive Archival Representation and the 
Zong Massacre of 1781 
So here is what we believe we know at least, here is the 
appearance: the other will never again respond. Now in spite of 
these necessities, these obvious facts and these substantiated 
certitudes, in spite of all the reassuring assurances which such a 
knowing or such a believing-to-know dispenses to us, through 
them, the phantom continues to speak. Perhaps he does not 
respond, but he speaks. A phantom speaks. What does this mean? 
— Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever 
Not unlike Derrida’s Archive Fever, my project begins not at the archive, but 
rather at the phantoms of drowned captives that speak in and through silence, their voices 
circumscribed by a dearth of archival records. 
On 6 September 1781, the slave ship Zong departed São Tomé and set a course 
for Jamaica. Below deck, 470 kidnapped Africans were crammed into a cargo hold 
designed to hold less than half their number. The crew numbered at 17, too small to 
maintain adequate sanitary conditions aboard the ship. Six to nine weeks was the 
customary duration of such a venture, but—as a result of a navigational error on the part 
of its Captain Luke Collingwood—it would be 107 days before the ship would arrive at 
its destination. 
When the Zong finally arrived at Black River, Jamaica on 22 December 1781, 
there were only 208 Africans in the cargo hold. These survivors were subsequently sold 
at market. The disappeared 262 persons were deemed lost cargo: “sixty negroes died for 
want of water for sustenance; and forty others, for want of water for sustenance, and 
through thirst and frenzy thereby occasioned, threw themselves into the sea and were 
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drowned; and the master and mariners, for the preservation of their own lives and the 
lives of the rest of the negroes…were obliged to throw overboard 150 other negroes” 
(qtd. in Philip 210). 
These quantitative figures are well-documented, but if we were to search for the 
names of those who were murdered aboard the Zong, we would not find them. The 
drowned are not named in the slave ship captain’s ledger, the auctioneer’s bills of sale, 
the slaveholder’s account books, nor do they appear in the court stenographer’s transcript 
of the insurance dispute that ensued as a consequence. With respect to the Zong’s 107-
day voyage and its crew’s decision to throw 150 Africans overboard to their deaths, few 
records remain. The ship’s logbook is thought to have disappeared along with its Captain 
Collingwood when he disembarked in Jamaica on 22 December 1781. What remains is 
the legal paraphernalia of insurance dispute, Gregson v. Gilbert.  
None of the surviving documents name the drowned, nor do they preserve their 
voices. 
 Perhaps the closest we can get to their names is the sales book of Thomas Case, 
an agent in Jamaica who did business with the Gregson syndicate, owners of the Zong. In 
“Notanda,” the epilogue to her collection of found poetry, M. NourbeSe Philip recounts 
her experience reading a copy of Case’s sales book, which she received from a colleague. 
Although the document does not account for the transaction in which the survivors from 
the Zong were sold, NourbeSe claims, “It is typical of records kept at that time: 
Purchasers are identified while Africans are reduced to the stark description of ‘negroe 
man,’ [sic] ‘negroe woman,’ or, more frequently, ‘ditto man,’ ‘ditto woman’” (Philip 
194). What do we know apart from that? “Their financial value…was recorded and 
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preserved for insurance purposes,” NourbeSe notes (194). As such, we know that the 
survivors were valued at 30 pounds sterling a head.  
 Apart from that? Nothing but one more, meagre detail. It is the word itself. 
“Meagre” is the word Case used to describe enslaved girls. As such: “Negroe girl 
(meagre).” “There are many ‘meagre’ girls,” NourbeSe writes, “no ‘meagre’ boys” (194). 
Beyond that single word, nothing more. 
For those who read the colonial and slavery archives in search of the enslaved’s 
names and voices, “meagre” is perhaps the best adjective to describe the records 
themselves. Those words constitute the meagre sum of what these archives can offer us 
about those murdered aboard the Zong. Archival records simultaneously circumscribe the 
enslaved in the impossibility to know anything particularizing about them, yet also 
constitute the horizon of possibility for our ever learning about them. In other words, it is 
because the slave ship captains, auctioneers, masters, and courts recorded their 
transactions so fastidiously that we know that this massacre happened at all. The 
enslaved’s phantoms speak in and as archival silence. 
Confrontations with this and other archives of slavery and colonization have 
marked a site of literary plenitude in recent years. By acknowledging that the archives do 
not represent the enslaved and colonized Other as persons, these literary interventions 
often function as what Martinican philosopher Édouard Glissant calls a tale, which “can 
react to a gap in history by simply acknowledging it” (Glissant 84) and queer theorist 
Anjali Arondekar terms an “additive model of subalternity,” or “the desire to add and fill 
in the gaps with voices of other unvoiced subalterns” (Arondekar 6), and Saidiya 
Hartman names “the instant of possibility” (“Venus in Two Acts” 8). As narrative, 
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additive representation often functions by centering points of view forbidden from the 
archival record. For instance: there are no extant autobiographical narratives by female 
survivors of the Middle Passage, let alone survivors of the Zong. As such, a novel like 
Fred D’Aguiar’s Feeding the Ghosts (1999)—by including the first-person testimonial of 
Mintah, D’Aguiar’s invented female survivor of the Zong massacre—responds to the 
archival dearth. In the Glissantian mode, D’Aguiar’s text “attacks the sacred status of the 
written word” of History in Gregson v. Gilbert by exploiting the legal text’s omissions 
(Glissant 84). Rather, the information recorded in Gregson v. Gilbert does not and cannot 
preclude the possibility that, unbeknownst to the archivist or unacknowledged by the 
archival record, a captive like Mintah may have survived being thrown overboard. In this 
sense, additive representation exposes the fallibilities of History, which is itself a 
representative master narrative fashioned from the testimonials of witnesses who were 
said to have been present at the event in question. The silences in archival history allow 
cultural producers to fill its gaps with tales and voices that, although fabulated1, remain 
possible. As such, additive texts themselves read as archives of possibility. 
However, these literary-archival interventions have also emblemized a problem of 
additive representation. That is, how and why does the archive limit additive 
interventions? In “Venus in Two Acts,” Hartman explains, “The archive of slavery rests 
                                                      
1 In “Venus in Two Acts,” Hartman describes a writing practice she names “critical fabulation.” She writes, 
“This double gesture can be described as straining against the limits of the archive to write a cultural 
history of the captive, and, at the same time, enacting the impossibility of representing the lives of the 
captives precisely through the process of narration” (“Venus in Two Acts” 11). She goes on, “Narrative 
restraint, the refusal to fill in the gaps and provide closure, is a requirement of this method, as is the 
imperative to respect black noise—the shrieks, the moans, the nonsense, and the opacity, which are always 
in excess of legibility and of the law and which hint at and embody aspirations that are wildly utopian, 
derelict to capitalism, and antithetical to its attendant discourse of Man” (12). 
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upon a founding violence. This violence determines, regulates and organizes the kinds of 
statements that can be made about slavery” (“Venus in Two Acts” 10). Founding 
violence circumscribes possibility. Although extant archival records deny the dead their 
names and voices, they also catalogue the statements that licensed their deaths aboard the 
slave ship (10). To remain possible, each tale must not trespass the limits of the archival 
record. We cannot undo the archive’s founding violence: it is impossible to recover the 
dead’s names or to restore their lives. Therefore, in attempting to excavate possibility for 
the enslaved through narrative, one must not fail to account for the material incumbencies 
that defined their lives and their deaths.  
At the same time, each tale’s narrative must remain singular—that is, one 
possible tale among a multiplicity of other possibilities. Our inability to know what 
happened aboard the Zong, which is itself the condition of possibility for every singular 
tale, also makes it impossible to determine which tale is most accurate, factual, or true. 
Additive representation can only function as an archive of possibility insofar as it 
problematizes any attempt to create a single master narrative, including an attempt of its 
own. 
For instance, in “The Dead Book,” the seventh chapter of Lose Your Mother: A 
Journey Along the Atlantic Slave Route, Hartman tells six tales. All six focus on the 
torture and murder of a girl aboard the slave ship Recovery in 1791. Each tale, Hartman 
explains one year after publishing Lose Your Mother, was intended “to expose and 
exploit the incommensurability between the experience of the enslaved and the fictions of 
history” (“Venus in Two Acts” 10). The first five tales are narrated from the perspectives 
of Captain John Kimber, the girl’s murderer; the Recovery’s third mate and surgeon, who 
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witnessed her torture and murder; William Wilberforce, the English abolitionist who 
successfully lobbied Parliament to try Kimber for the girl’s murder; and John Weskett, 
who wrote an eighteenth century tome on English insurance law. 
The sixth and final tale, however, is what I would like to focus on more closely. 
My reason for emphasizing the sixth over the others is that, unlike the previous five tales, 
this tale is told from the girl’s perspective. Although Hartman alters nothing insofar as 
the girl is still starved, tortured, and murdered in her tale, she still breathes an instant of 
possibility into the narrative by affording the girl a measure of resistant hope: as she dies, 
the girl does not think of herself as a “pitiful and weak…girl slumped in a dirty puddle”; 
instead, she imagines her death as “a way off the ship” that would send her “soaring and 
on her way home” (Lose Your Mother 152). Those six words—soaring and on her way 
home—conclude the girl’s tale. Immediately afterward, however, Hartman confesses to a 
lingering malaise.  
If the story ended there, I could feel a small measure of comfort. I could 
hold on to this instant of possibility. I could find a salutary lesson in the 
girl’s suffering and pretend a story was enough to save her from oblivion. 
I could sigh with relief and say, ‘It all happened so long ago.’ Then I could 
wade into the Atlantic and not think of the dead book. (153). 
 
Here, Hartman issues a warning: despite the possibility that the girl’s tale may succeed in 
exposing “the incommensurability between the experience of the enslaved and the 
fictions of history,” it is not enough to “save her from oblivion” (“Venus in Two Acts” 
10). Hartman’s recognition that “[her] account replicates the very order of violence that it 
writes against by placing yet another demand upon the girl, by requiring that her life be 
made useful or instructive, by finding in it a lesson for our future or a hope for history” 
both haunts and sobers her (14). She knew it from the beginning, by her own admission, 
 7 
and yet—even so, she cannot allow herself to “sigh with relief” and distance herself from 
the girl’s murder, much less the other histories of the Middle Passage; nor does she stop 
herself from disinterring other instants of possibility a year later in “Venus in Two Acts,” 
always with the cognizance that the “task of writing the impossible…has as its 
prerequisites the embrace of likely failure and the readiness to accept the ongoing, 
unfinished and provisional character of this effort, particularly when the arrangements of 
power occlude the very object that we desire to rescue” (14). Fully cognizant that the task 
is an endless one, Hartman reaffirms that we can only continue trying to write the 
impossible, unrepresentable histories of the Middle Passage. 
In other words, if the intent in additive representation lies in, as Hartman claims, 
“laboring to paint as full a picture of the lives of the captives as possible” (11), then it 
follows that each of these singular tales must engage something akin to a phenomenology 
of the slave ship. To depict the captive as an actor rather than an object, writers question 
how the enslaved related to or interacted with the material incumbencies documented by 
the archive. In other words, this questioning involves doing the work of depicting the 
enslaved as the persons they were. That is, as speaking, listening, feeling, tasting, seeing 
singular subjects possessing intentionality, structures of consciousness, and subjectivity. 
Of these, our study aims to examine, most specifically, the phenomena of 
speaking and listening vis-à-vis both the historical event and additive textual 
representations of the Zong massacre. Or, simply put, the Zong as soundscape. More 
broadly, our study seeks to demonstrate how the figure of the singular voice responds to 
several of the dilemmas surrounding the question of additive representation. What does it 
mean for a phantom to speak? Moreover, what does it mean for a phantom to speak in, as, 
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and through silence? Is it possible to create a textual space in which a voice may 
resurface? 
By reading the texts of M. NourbeSe Philip, Fred D’Aguiar, Jean-Luc Nancy, 
Jacques Derrida, and Toni Morrison for the voice, I will demonstrate that—as sonic 
phenomenon—the voice is a site in which historical materialist and deconstructive-ethical 
approaches to the Middle Passage intersect and enrich one another. Instead of plumbing 
the enslaved’s voice for discursively meaningful content, I prioritize the co-constitutive 
material and ethical dimensions of the voice as sound. The intention informing this 
project is nothing as revelatory as explaining how creative writers—be they NourbeSe, 
D’Aguiar, or Morrison—recover the voices of the murdered slaves, but rather to examine 
how they apprehend the form which creates the space in which these singular voices may 
sound out and, possibly, be heard. 
Like the living, the dead had their own voices. The question then becomes how 
we can access, carry, bear witness, or listen to voices that have, long before our births, 
been forever lost. In acknowledgment of this question, voice is examined in two distinct, 
yet closely interrelated dimension: first, the figured or represented voice; second, the 
irrecuperable singular voice as material sound. Whereas the first of these dimensions 
refers to the absence of the captives’ perspective or voice from the archival record, the 
second underscores the literal voice of the captive, lost with their death. In the absence of 
the dead captives’ voices as such, additive representation recreates or figures possible 
voices. While these possible voices and the enslaved’s singular voices are 
incommensurate, I will demonstrate how their inaccessibility and incommensurability 
safeguards and enables each. The absence of the singular, material voice is not nothing. 
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Rather, it is the palpability of its absence from the archival record as silence that both 
enables and demands additive representation. In this sense, many of the “rhetorical” 
dimensions of voice, as outlined in the first section on Nancy and Derrida, belong most 
properly to the material dimension of voice as sound. 
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Section 1: 
The Figured Voices: The Call to Responsibility 
Must we bear witness to the nameless and disremembered dead who perished 
aboard the Zong? If it is indeed impossible to undo the founding violence of the archive 
by representing their material, singular voices as such, then why create additive 
representations of their figured voices in the first place?  
 This dilemma stems from a particular confusion surrounding the in/adequacy of 
representation. The absence of the captives’ figured voices from the archive is what 
necessitates the creation of supplementary, literary archives of possibility, but it is also 
the loss of their material voices—which is to say, not solely their voices, but also their 
singular subjectivities—with their deaths which imbues the work of additive 
representation with the urgency of an imperative. Without their voices as such, there are 
only possibilities and material incumbencies. In other words, the lack of the captives’ 
voices and our inability to recover them as such prohibit definitive narrativization or 
knowledge of the event in question, as with historical accounts. This prohibition also 
extends to narratives that omit the captives’ voices, because silence and omission in 
historical narratives are themselves forms of foreclosure to possibility. 
  Whether explicitly thematized as such or not, the question, which I will call the 
question of the imperative, nonetheless preoccupies not only Hartman’s projects, but the 
projects of her contemporaries. Poet M. NourbeSe Philip, for example, acknowledges 
that, while writing Zong!—a collection of found poetry through which she attempts to 
bear witness to and represent the Zong massacre of 1781—she risks becoming like Luke 
Collingwood, the Zong’s captain. Or, as Victoria Austen frames NourbeSe’s dilemma in 
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her article “Zong!’s ‘Should we?’: Questioning the Ethical Representation of Trauma,” 
“If [NourbeSe] assumes the power to represent the massacre without remaining conscious 
of her questionable right to do so, her act of representation could like-wise be a form of 
domination” (Austen 66). Even so, NourbeSe affirms, and reaffirms, her obligation to 
write Zong!. She writes, “This story that must be told; that can only be told by not telling 
[emphasis added]” (qtd. in Saunders 74). NourbeSe’s apprehension of becoming 
Collingwood, we will note, resonates keenly with Hartman’s sobering acknowledgment 
that, in attempting to represent the experiences of the two girls murdered aboard the 
Recovery, she has replicated the violence that allowed the girls to be murdered in the first 
place. Similarly, NourbeSe’s commitment to tell the story of the Zong massacre’s victims 
by not telling foregrounds Hartman’s affirmation that the task of writing the impossible 
must embrace its likely failure. To tell without telling, then, is perhaps to embrace the 
impossibility of representation, which, as we have seen, constitutes the very horizon of 
possibility for telling.  
Like Hartman and NourbeSe, Omise’eke Natasha Tinsley grapples with the 
question of the imperative in her article “Black Atlantic, Queer Atlantic: Queer 
Imaginings of the Middle Passage.” With Tinsley, the question manifests in her 
concomitant insistence that we acknowledge the material lived experiences that give the 
oceanic metaphors of the black Atlantic their power and refusal to figure the Atlantic as a 
point of origin for blackness, queerness, or black queerness. Indeed, while Tinsley takes 
theorists like Paul Gilroy and Antonio Benítez-Rojo to task for “[mining] the metaphoric 
possibilities of the sea” (Tinsley 195) without “[plumbing] the archival ocean materially, 
as space that churns with physical remnants, dis(re)membered bodies of the Middle 
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Passage” (194), she also refuses to “strip theory of watery metaphors” (212) altogether. 
Tinsley also critiques Gilroy, Benítez-Rojo, and Glissant for overlooking the queer 
experiences and histories of the Middle Passage; in this vein, her thinking resonates with 
Hartman’s exposition of the exigency “to paint as full a picture of the lives of the captives 
as possible” (“Venus in Two Acts” 11). Tinsley goes on to write, “The maritime 
metaphors of Gilroy and Benítez-Rojo move toward a kind of closure…. Yet such closure 
is made possible only by washing over important materialities and multiplicities in 
visions of diaspora and region” (“Black Atlantic, Queer Atlantic” 202). By “washing over 
important materialities and multiplicities,” Tinsley claims, Gilroy’s and Benítez-Rojo’s 
metaphors move toward closure, toward an end—a closure and an end of metaphor that, 
as we have observed, is impossible by its very condition of possibility. For Tinsley, then, 
the question of the imperative presences in “Black Atlantic, Queer Atlantic” as the 
exigency to acknowledge the unknowable lived experiences of the enslaved Africans that 
nonetheless imbue metaphors with their power. Moreover, and perhaps most strikingly, 
Tinsley—like Hartman and NourbeSe—responds to the question with her intervention. 
As we have observed, Hartman, NourbeSe, and Tinsley each grapple with—and 
respond to—the question of the imperative within the histories of enslavement and 
postcolonial theory. However—and although my own project, like Hartman’s, 
NourbeSe’s, and Tinsley’s, is most precisely interested in disinterring the enduring 
imperatives of the Middle Passage—the histories of enslavement and postcoloniality are 
not the only contexts within which one may disinter these exigencies, these instants of 
possibility. I would submit that the question of the imperative, the same endless task, 
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inexorably demands the attentions of Jean-Luc Nancy and Jacques Derrida as well—if in 
a different, yet still identifiable, form.  
In his essay “The Free Voice of Man,” Nancy thematizes this imperative to 
remain open to possibility by linking it with the structure of a question. He writes, “The 
obligation is, more simply, more modestly, one of maintaining (garder) the question, as a 
question” (Lacoue Labarthe and Nancy 39). To maintain the question as a question, the 
imperative to possibility must interrupt any force that threatens to deactivate the question. 
As James Gilbert-Walsh describes the imperative in “Broken imperatives: The ethical 
dimension of Nancy’s thought,” “Being-in-common happens as a kind of interruptive 
‘event’, an event which is not merely a condition for the possibility of concrete 
communication but this very communication itself” (Gilbert-Walsh 31). Gilbert-Walsh 
goes on to write, “This interruptive event whereby being-in-common ‘happens’ is none 
other than the imperative address par excellence—but such that the sens of the imperative 
must be heard otherwise, and heard otherwise each time it is heard” (31). Being-in-
common, which for Nancy is a constitutive event of being wherein my and the other’s 
finitude2 is co-exposed, occurs most properly as a singular interruption. We will note that 
being-in-common, finitude, and interruption each refer to specific articulations of the 
same constitutive event of being3, and that it is as, in, and through this movement—a 
                                                      
2 In Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time, finitude, or being-towards-death, refers to the recognition that we 
as human beings will one day die and thus have a finite amount of time with which to live. Nancy expands 
on Heidegger’s notion of finitude by observing that we recognize our finitude through a co-exposure: by 
witnessing the death of another, I recognize that one day I will die as well. So too is the case for the other, 
who recognizes their finitude through my own death. 
 
3 In her reading of Nancy’s “The Inoperative Community,” Ana Luszczynska notes, “The terms ecstasy, 
singularity, and community are so closely related that one could argue that they are indistinguishable” (56). 
 14 
preconscious and prelinguistic constitutive event of being—that the imperative address is 
heard. 
 While the imperative to possibility speaks as, in, and through a constitutive event 
of being, it is also singular. In the words of Gilbert-Walsh, the imperative must be “heard 
otherwise each time it is heard.” The sharing, dividing, and co-exposing of finitude—
which Nancy also refers to as community, his reformulation of Heideggerian being-with 
[Mitsein] as first philosophy—may only happen with the other. But we know that “the 
other” is a collective noun; it refers not to one other par excellence, but to all possible 
others. Our being-with is a being-many, and it this being-many that makes the imperative 
address singular. Each time I encounter an other, which is to say each time I encounter 
a—possibly but not always necessarily different (that is, not only different from me—and 
difference from me is what makes the other other to me and makes me other to the 
other—but different from other others, which is the difference that makes each other 
singular)—other, I must listen to the imperative address otherwise. That is to say, 
difference is implicated here not only between others, but also between encounters with 
others. Although I may encounter the same other multiple times, the experience of each 
encounter will necessarily differ from all previous and future experiences of encounter 
with that particular other. As such, the imperative address will not sound the same way 
each time, but will differ infinitely in each encounter with each other I am exposed to. So 
the imperative speaks, if it can be said to speak, as the singular voice of the other—all 
others to whom I am exposed, in each interruptive instant of that exposure. 
 We have disinterred a few crucial implications that require unpacking. First, that 
finitude compears. In other words, and to expand on my passing reference to this effect 
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above: finitude is not; rather, finitude happens as an event—namely, an event with the 
structure of a co-exposing, dividing, and sharing with the other that is heard as the 
other’s voice. The compearance of my and the other’s finitude is the recognition that the 
other and I are finite beings: that we will die. Only the other can expose me to this 
recognition; after all, I cannot access my death myself until the instant of my death—at 
which point I have already died. By presenting me with my ownmost, radically 
irrecuperable death, the other gives me access to what—according to Nancy—is most 
properly my own. I therefore stand before the other already hopelessly indebted. It is in 
this way that my exposure to the other and the other’s exposure to me interrupt any 
presumption either of us may have of being anything other than finite, singular beings. In 
“The Inoperative Community,” Nancy frames the interruption this way: “Community is, 
in a sense, resistance itself: namely, resistance to immanence” (Nancy 35). Community, 
which is the compearance of finitude, intrinsically resists and interrupts immanence. 
Finitude (co)exposes what is at stake for us as singular beings. Because it is only through 
the other that I can be exposed to our finitude, I am as such responsible to the other. And 
because, at bottom, the other is other to me because they are different than me, it is 
“difference [that] brings forth duty by itself” (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 46).  
It is because we are finite, singular beings that the imperative speaks as and 
through the other’s interruptive voice, or that we can conceive any notion of the ethical 
whatsoever. The voice speaks the opening of ethics, which obligates us to interrupt 
anything that would circumscribe the question of the imperative—for it is the question, 
by virtue of its very structure as a question, that can remain open to the other in a manner 
that the answer, by virtue of its very structure as a definitive answer, cannot. It is crucial 
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here to draw a distinction between an answer and a response. Whereas an answer is 
definitive, a response is singular. In other words, an answer deactivates the question by 
answering it, as in a basic math problem; a response simply responds to the question 
without precluding other, different responses. Within the framework of additive archival 
representation, History is the answer and a tale, instant of possibility, or additive 
representation is a response. 
 Furthermore, Nancy asserts that community is a preconscious and prelinguistic 
constitutive event of being. If community is preconscious and prelinguistic, then we can 
never lose it—at least not until the moment of our deaths. As such, what follows the 
recognition of our inability to lose community is the recognition, closely related to the 
first, that we have never not been in and as community. That is, the other not only gives 
me the knowledge of my birth and my death, but the very language by which I am 
constituted. In predating language, that which constitutes my consciousness, 
community—being-with the other—resists any teleological attempt to trace it to a point 
of origin, which is itself a deactivation of the question that the imperative calls us to 
maintain. Nancy observes, “Community means, consequently, that there is no singular 
being without another singular being, and that there is, therefore, what might be called, in 
a rather inappropriate idiom, an originary or ontological ‘sociality’ that in its principle 
extends far beyond the simple theme of man as a social being” (Nancy 28). The 
groundless ground of being is what philosopher David Wood calls the “always already,” 
or the recognition “that the origin is structurally recessive, that it cannot be represented 
within the conceptual level at which its absence is nonetheless being felt” (Wood 1-2). 
This is why, as Wood goes on to claim later in The Step Back: Ethics and Politics after 
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Deconstruction, that “we think of responsibility too late if we think of it as a property of a 
‘subject’” (146). Indeed, as radically relational beings, we have always already been with 
the other, always already been indebted to the other, and always already been called into 
responsibility by the imperative. At bottom, and whether or not we choose to open 
ourselves to, acknowledge, or listen to their call, we are always already called into 
responsibility to the other. 
  As we have discussed, the imperative is closely related to the other precisely 
because it speaks as the interruptive voice of the other, which resists immanence and calls 
us into responsibility. That said, we have yet to ask: responsibility to whom? Why, 
responsibility to the other, of course. At this point, I will now shift to focus our thinking 
primarily on the question, imperative, and responsibility in Derrida and Wood. 
In “Eating Well,” Derrida says that “responsibility is excessive or it is not a 
responsibility [emphasis mine]” (qtd. in Wood 140). Apropos of this statement in 
Derrida, philosopher David Wood writes: 
Derrida contrasts responsibility as calculable with responsibility as 
excessive. The way he elaborates on the excessive (references to the 
billions of my fellows, etc.) suggests an ill-advised quantitative 
interpretation, one that nonetheless rightly explodes any deal by which I 
have given myself a good conscience…. But there are two better ways of 
thinking of the interpretation of responsibility as openness to the other. 
The first I have already adumbrated: My exposure to the other means that 
there are no a priori limits to my responsibilities. But there are limits; I 
cannot save all the drowning children. The second way of grasping the 
interconnectedness of these two levels is no less significant here for 
having a broader application. Responsibility as openness to the other can 
function adverbially as a modal operator in the way we deal with and 
understand such finite responsibilities as we do take on: willingly 
accepting consequential or corollary responsibilities, and acknowledging 
responsibilities we would never  
have chosen. (147) 
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Of course, Wood is correct to distinguish between exposure to the other as “some huge, 
excessive obligation” and exposure to the other rather as “a complex openness to 
requests, demands, pleas that call not just for an acknowledgment of my obligations, but 
for scrutiny, for negotiations, for interpretations, and, ultimately, for recognizing both 
opportunities and limitations” (146). Openness to the other does not translate simply and 
redoubtably into a willingness to shoulder and discharge a responsibility for them—that 
is, to act on an alleged responsibility on the other’s behalf. To take on and discharge 
some perceived, ostensible responsibility for the other is not inherently ethical, but 
potentially and dangerously unethical. Indeed: what of the other to whom my 
intervention—my assumption of responsibility for them—is unwanted? And what of the 
Other for whom the conqueror, the colonizer, and the imperialist claimed responsibility, a 
white man’s burden? We must not forget that the language of responsibility has been and 
continues to be used to justify colonization, enslavement, exploitation, and oppression. 
But by emphasizing that exposure to the other is instead a complex openness to requests, 
demands, and pleas, Wood underscores the imperative of hearing, listening, and 
responding to the other’s call, the other’s voice.  
However, I hesitate to agree with Wood’s misgivings about Derrida’s elaboration 
on excessive responsibility.4 The adjective “excessive” describes the task of 
responsibility itself. In other words, it is not that we as finite human beings are 
inadequate before the task, but the task itself prohibits an end. Rather, I would submit that 
exposure to the other must not be delimited at the face-to-face encounter—but rather, and 
                                                      
4 This intervention is based solely on my readings of this text, Wood’s The Step Back: Ethics and Politics 
after Deconstruction, and his earlier book, Thinking after Heidegger. 
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as Wood suggests with his emphasis on requests, demands, and pleas, that exposure also 
be considered in terms of the aural and the auditory.  
My suggestion has a few dimensions. A voice is simultaneously singular—
singularly of a single, unique singular being—and intrinsically toward, indelibly 
communicative. A voice spaces itself out from the singular being to whom it belongs and 
into the world. As such, there is never not a possibility that this voice may be heard by 
others. Moreover, there is never not a possibility that one may hear an other’s voice in 
such a way that it would seem, in the moment of hearing it, disembodied. For instance, 
while walking down the street I may hear an other’s voice coming from the next street 
over, an apartment with an open window, or a nearby car radio. In that moment, I may 
not be able to locate the other to whom this voice belongs. It does not follow than an 
exposure to the other’s voice must coincide with a face-to-face encounter with the other 
themself. My exposure to the other’s voice may occur in the form of a non-encounter, a 
non-coincidence. The first dimension of the suggestion, then, is that my exposure to the 
other need not occur in the same physical space. 
Following inextricably in the wake of the first dimension, the second is that my 
exposure to the other need not occur in the same temporal horizon. One of the most 
accessible points of departure for this thinking involves the question of writing. Or rather: 
is the other’s voice delimited to a verbalization? Can the other’s voice be read as an 
inscription as well as heard as a verbalization? We will note that writing already ruptures 
the delimitation of exposure to the other as a face-to-face encounter. By inscribing my 
thoughts on a sheet of paper, for instance, I distance it from myself. The other can thus 
read my writing—hear my voice—even when I am not there with them. The act of 
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inscribing, according to Barbara Johnson, transforms one’s thoughts “into something that 
can be read by someone far away, even after the writer’s death” (Johnson ix). With 
inscription, the spatial act of distancing one’s thoughts from oneself through writing or 
audio recording constitutes a temporal dimension—an indeterminate time (indeed, at any 
time) after the writer’s or speaker’s death. Together, the spatial and temporal dimensions 
arealize the horizon of possibility for exposure to the other. According to Nancy, an 
areality is an event’s “nature as an area, as formed space” (Nancy 20). Our use of this 
term places particular emphasis on the second of Nancy’s gestures above; that is, to 
underscore these spatial and temporal dimensions as space-forming in an ontological 
sense. In these contexts, does my voice not sound out when I am not present—even, 
possibly, after I have died? 
Yet we must take this thinking of exposure and its arealizing dimensions further. 
What of the dead other who was never privileged with the opportunity or skills necessary 
to inscribe and distance their thoughts from themself? What of the dead other who we 
only know as the Other—the slaves, the murdered, the drowned, the victims—and not by 
their names? What of the dead Other who we only know about through representations 
created by the Subject—the very same Subject that refused to represent the dead Other as 
anything but cargo, chattel, commodity, or property? 
I am referring, of course, to those enslaved aboard Zong. At nearly every turn, the 
voices of the enslaved Africans have been silenced and forbidden from the preservation 
of the colonialists’ and slavers’ archives. Yet, as NourbeSe reminds us, “their archive—
the archive of the owner and the lawmaker—is in fact the only [grave] marker” for the 
drowned Africans (Saunders 69). As we have observed, these archives are the horizon of 
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possibility for our knowing about the dead we will never be capable of naming or 
listening to as such. How, then, can we be exposed to this enslaved other—these millions 
of others denied their names and their voices? Can we be responsible to the other whose 
voice we can only know as silence?  
But the absence of something is not nothing5, and it is precisely this “not nothing” 
that we must attempt to tease out. In other words, my exposure to the other as such: not 
simply to the other with whom I share a spatial and temporal horizon—the other with 
whom I am there with (which is to say physically present alongside) at the same time and 
in the same place—but to the other to whom I am exposed only through a representation. 
In other words, both archival silence and additive archival representation expose us to the 
lost voices of the enslaved precisely as an absence. And, in this vein, I would push the 
limit yet further: I am in some way responsible to the other to whom I can only ever be 
exposed through representation; to the other for whom it is impossible to encounter me, 
separated as we are by time, space, and death? 
Again: must we bear witness to the nameless and disremembered dead who 
perished aboard the Zong? What does it mean that their phantoms speak in silence? 
Their voices, as a silenced absence and additive representations, respond: yes, we 
must. Bearing witness through the addition and guarding of possibility itself responds to 
                                                      
5 In her insightful explication of Nancy’s “The Inoperative Community,” Ana Luszczynska links the notion 
of the “not nothing” to a thinking of excess and sovereignty. She writes, “…the excess to which being is 
exposed and abandoned (which is sovereignty) is not a substance. It is not a thing that could present itself 
or let itself be appropriated. In fact, Nancy indicates that this excess, properly speaking, is not, in a manner 
similar to the way that Heideggerian Being is not” (Luszczynska 59). In this context, a thing or substance is 
best conceptualized as a form that is static or congealed enough to present itself visibly. On the other hand, 
sound is no-thing; that is, it is not a thing, but rather occurs as a material phenomenon or event. Yet despite 
the fact that sound is not a substance, that does not mean that it is nothing.; 
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the imperative to maintain the questions surrounding these voices—what they sounded 
like, the names of those they belonged to, and so on—as questions.  
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Section 2: 
In the Interim: Black Noise and Manufactured Archival Silence 
First published in 1997, Fred D’Aguiar’s Feeding the Ghosts reads as a sharp 
response to the Zong archive’s dearth vis-à-vis the accounts, experiences, or voices of the 
enslaved. The novel reconstructs the Zong case with a narrative divided into three 
sections and bookended by a ghostly-narrated prologue and an epilogue. The first part is 
set aboard the Zong. Beginning with the crew’s decision to throw their captives 
overboard and ending three days later with their decision to stop, this narrative is told 
from the perspectives of the captives and crew alike. The second section narrativizes the 
1783 court case between the Gregson syndicate and their insurers. The third and last 
section is the first person testimony of Mintah, a woman who survived the massacre and 
spends the rest of her life bearing witness to its victims.  
Among the literary texts examined in this study, Feeding the Ghosts is the most 
conventional example of additive archival representation. In the novel’s second section, 
Mintah’s written account of what transpired aboard the Zong resurfaces during the 
insurance dispute. Although Lord Mansfield initially verifies the document—that is, he 
accepts that the document was written by an enslaved woman aboard the Zong, and that a 
woman like Mintah, literate in English, even existed at all—he is quickly convinced 
otherwise. First, Kelsal, the first mate, admits in his testimony that Mintah did exist, was 
thrown overboard, and did manage to make it back aboard the ship to incite “acts of near 
rebellion” among the other captives, but also casts aspersions on her credibility and 
impartiality as a witness (D’Aguiar 159). Kelsal testifies, “She recorded what she saw or 
was told from her hiding place on the ship. Whatever she wrote was dictated by her 
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distress at being a slave when she had been free and could read and write” (159). After 
the boatswain testifies to Mintah’s “insolent” and “foolish” character (161) and the 
second mate claims to “smell a rat” before proposing that Mintah was “not one woman 
but a lot of people playing the part of one woman” (162), the Gregson syndicate’s lawyer 
capitalizes on the captain’s ensuing episode of near-catatonia on the witness stand6, then 
contends that “this slave’s account is a fabrication by the insurers and as such it should 
not have been admitted as evidence because a slave could not have written it” (168). 
Ironically, the lawyer goes on to cite Captain Cunningham’s own ledger, which he wrote 
aboard the ship during the massacre, to further his argument. While Kelsal succeeds in 
impugning Mintah’s credibility by alluding to her distress over being enslaved, no one—
not even the insurers’ lawyer—thinks to raise similar doubts about Cunningham’s ledger. 
In other words, the court’s willingness to believe in Mintah’s ostensibly obvious bias 
belies their inability to countenance that Cunningham may have fabricated his account of 
the events that transpired, which would have been in his best interest to do.7 
The aforementioned irony, in fact, belies the entire section’s underlying irony. 
The mere existence of Mintah’s written testimony appeals to our desire to recover not 
only her voice, but the voices and subjectivities of any one of the 470 captives crammed 
                                                      
6 Captain Cunningham’s appearance at the trial was a creative liberty on D’Aguiar’s part, along with the 
decision to change the captain’s name from “Collingwood” to “Cunningham.” With respect to the historical 
event, Captain Luke Collingwood died on 25 December 1781, three days after disembarking the Zong at 
Black River, Jamaica. His logbook was thought to have disappeared with him. As such, neither 
Collingwood or his ledger appeared during the legal proceedings two years later. 
 
7 Even though Collingwood’s ledger disappeared and was therefore never accepted as evidence, the courts 
ultimately agreed: “The truth was, that finding they should have a bad market for their slaves, [the crew] 
took these means transferring of the loss from the owners to the underwriters” (qtd. in Philip 211). 
Fittingly, the first chapter of Feeding the Ghosts opens with the captain exhorting the crew to throw the 
sick and dying Africans overboard for the express purpose of making a profit. 
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into the Zong’s cargo hold. By writing its existence into his recreation of the case, 
D’Aguiar satiates our desire. For Mintah’s testimony is not additive archival 
representation. Within the context of the novel, Mintah’s testimony is, in reality, archival 
representation, a primary source. Yet the very nature of what we most desire—the voice 
of the captive, the truth of her firsthand perspective on the massacre—also serves as the 
grounds for its dismissal as evidence. It is precisely because Mintah is an enslaved 
African woman that the court rejects her book as evidence. In other words, it is because 
Mintah is exactly the kind of heroine that many of us most want to uncover from the 
archive of slavery that the court finds her too incredible to be trusted or, ultimately, to 
have existed. 
By additively offering us Mintah’s written testimony only to have it rejected by 
his representation of the court, D’Aguiar mimes the violence of the archive itself. Yet to 
understand the nature of this violence, we must first understand the archive itself. 
 To begin with, the archive is inextricably constituted by a physical dimension of 
some sort.8  In “The Power of the Archive and Its Limits,” Achille Mbembe describes the 
archive as both a “building, a symbol of public institution, which is one of the organs of a 
constituted state” and “a collection of documents – usually written documents – kept in 
this building” (Mbembe 19). According to Mbembe, every definition of the term 
“archives” must account for both the archive-as-building—that is, the space occupied by 
                                                      
8 I would submit that all archives retain an inextricably spatial dimension—even with the advent of digital 
archives. Although digital archives host data on a website or operating system instead of housing 
documents in a building, this data also occupies physical space in the sense that 1) storing digital material 
take up memory, or space on the hard drive or server, which are themselves material objects with finite 
capacities for storage, and 2) these hard drives and servers take up physical space and must therefore be 
housed someplace themselves.  
 
 26 
the site of the building—and the archive-as-documents—the materials stored in the 
building. The intersection of physical space and material documents9 constitutes “the 
inescapable materiality of the archive” (19). By virtue of its very existence—its tangible 
materiality—Mbembe goes on to argue, “the archive becomes something that does away 
with doubt, exerting a debilitating power over such doubt. It then acquires a status of 
proof…that a life truly existed, that something actually happened, an account of which 
can be put together” (20-1). The materials stored within an archive are, essentially, 
preserved artifacts from the past; their irrefutable physical presence effectively imbues 
them with the status of empirical, positivist proof about something that happened. This 
status of proof in turn creates the condition of possibility for the historiographic 
account—taken from readings of and accounting for the archive’s collections—of that 
time. 
Yet it is precisely that it is a collection of documents housed in an archive that 
raises the following questions: indeed, who or what collects these documents? And by 
what criteria and procedures are these documents selected for acquisition, organization, 
and archival? “Archive,” rather, is not merely a place or a collection of documents. It is 
not only a noun, but also a transitive verb. To archive: in the sense that someone or 
something must collect these documents in order to organize and store them in the 
archive, and in the sense that someone or something must construct the physical space in 
which these documents are to be stored, be it in a building or on a server. An archive, in 
                                                      
9 With respect to the digitized archives, the documents which comprise, say, the slavery and colonial 
archives were themselves once material documents that were digitalized, or transcribed into a digital 
format. Therefore, when one views a digital representation of these archival records, the trace of the 
original document’s materiality also imbues the digital copy with the status of proof. 
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other words, is constructed by archiving. Mbembe describes the procedures by which the 
archive is constructed as “fundamentally a matter of discrimination and of selection, 
which, in the end, results in the granting of a privileged status to certain written 
documents, and the refusal of that status to others, thereby deemed ‘unarchivable’” (20). 
The matter of discrimination and of selection, of privileging certain documents as 
“archival” and marginalization of others as “unarchivable,” is a function of power: 
“power to make records of certain events and ideas and not of others…power to mediate 
the record, power over access, power over individual rights and freedoms, over collective 
memory and national identity” (Schwartz and Cook 5). Is it any wonder that Mintah’s 
testimony was rejected by the court and thereby deemed unarchivable? Indeed, according 
to Ann Laura Stoler, the archive is “a supreme technology of…the imperial state, a 
repository of codified beliefs beliefs that clustered (and bore witness to) connections 
between secrecy, the law, and power” (qtd. in Lowe 4). While power, Schwartz and Cook 
claim, does lie “at the heart…of the relationship between archives and the societies that 
create and use them,” it is also a concept which they admit is “largely absent from the 
traditional archival perspective” (Schwartz and Cook 5). The implications to be derived 
from the intersection of archival methodology and imperial state power are staggering, 
especially vis-à-vis historiography. In the end, we are left with an archive that, in the 
words of Randolph Starn, “not more—or less—than historical, which is to say, subject to 
or, more exactly, products of the vagaries of circumstance, accident, and interest. This 
truth is one of the most obvious and paradoxical about archives” (Starn 393). In light of 
this, how can one claim to have constructed a representative account of what happened in 
the past if these accounts are based only on tangible archival material? That is, if a 
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tangible primary source written by a captive like Mintah actually existed, would it have 
been deemed archivable? In Feeding the Ghosts, we know that it was not. Without 
preservation, the document may therefore have been destroyed. Even in the case where a 
document like Mintah’s had existed, lack or denial of preservation may have destroyed its 
original tangibility. In either case, the existence of a document does not guarantee its 
preservation: continued tangibility is in most cases only possible through preservation, 
and preservation is only possible through the efforts of a preserver. As such, the 
traditional historiographer’s sole reliance on tangible archival materials can be extremely 
dubious at best. 
The situation, of course, is infinitely more complicated than I have just described. 
The state is not the only entity capable of archiving or preserving documents. While the 
British judiciary refuses to validate Mintah’s testimony as archivable due to the court’s 
antiblack racism, it is certainly possible that other entities, such as British abolitionists, 
may have elected to preserve the document. The fact that it never made it into the hands 
of such interested parties has to do with Simon, the sympathetic white crewmember to 
whom Mintah entrusted her book, and his decision to “keep his grip on Mintah’s book 
and be buried with it” (D’Aguiar 179). 
Yet it is within the very space which is arealized by History’s dubious reliance on 
the tangible that Feeding the Ghosts exists as additive archival representation. For 
D’Aguiar’s novel is additive representation that rather performatively exposes the 
fallibility of the archive. In doing so, D’Aguiar makes a strong case for the necessity of 
additive archival representation like his own novel. In the epilogue, he brings the novel to 
a close with the following observations: 
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There is only the fact of the Zong and its unending voyage and those 
deaths that cannot be undone. Where death has begun but remains 
unfinished because it recurs. Where there is only the record of the sea. 
Those spirits are fled into wood. The ghosts feed on the story of 
themselves. The past is laid to rest when it is told. (230). 
 
Therein lies the aporia. The Zong’s voyage is past, yet it is unending precisely because 
“those deaths cannot be undone.” The 131 captives were murdered—are dead—yet the 
Zong lingers as a temporal site where “death has begun but remains unfinished because it 
recurs.” Although the “past is laid to rest when it is told,” the spirits have fled and remain 
at large; the ghosts continue to hunger and therefore must be fed not once and for all, but 
continuously. Only by telling these tales may the past be laid to rest. Yet the specters 
demand that witnesses tell stories about them again and again, meaning that laying the 
past to rest through telling, again and again and again, also lifts the past up in the very 
same act of telling. The specters’ hunger, their need to be fed with tales of themselves, 
exposes their enduring relevance to our very contemporary moment—the endless task. 
 In the novel, Mintah commits herself to undertaking this endless task. She devotes 
her life after the Zong to commemorating and remembering the dead, bearing witness to 
them through various materially and relationally significant means such as committing 
her testimony to paper, carving 131 wooden figures and planting 131 coconut trees to 
commemorate the 131 murdered captives, and helping twice as many enslaved persons 
flee from Maryland to freedom in the U.S. North. “Ghosts needed to be fed,” affirms the 
narrator. “She carved and wrote to assuage their hunger” (222). We will note that, apart 
from the evocation of the figured voice in Mintah’s written testimony, these modes of 
bearing witness have little to do with voice or sound. That said, even though D’Aguiar 
does not foreground voice or sound as explicitly as NourbeSe does in Zong!, these 
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themes nonetheless recur quite prominently in Feeding the Ghosts as both what Saidiya 
Hartman calls “black noise—the shrieks, the moans, the nonsense, and the opacity, which 
are always in excess of legibility and of the law and which hint at and embody aspirations 
that are wildly utopian, derelict to capitalism, and antithetical to its attendant discourse of 
Man” (“Venus in Two Acts” 12) and what Nancy thematizes as the interruptive voice of 
the other that calls us into responsibility. Black noise and the other’s interruptive voice 
are not mutually exclusive. It would be fair to say, in fact, that they denote precisely the 
same ethical phenomenon. 
 For an utterance to be opaque to or in excess of legibility is in part constituted by 
but not necessarily commensurate with linguistic intransigence. In the novel, the crew 
communicates primarily, if not exclusively, in English. Their monolingualism does 
cement a language barrier between the crew and their captives, but that barrier does not 
inhibit other, nondiscursive forms of communication. That is, communication continues 
to take place not only between captors and captives, but between the captives themselves. 
Far from being linguistically monolithic, the captives speak in “Yoruba, Ewe, Ibo, Fanti, 
Ashanti, Mandingo, Fetu, Foulah” (D’Aguiar 39). The captives’ linguistic and cultural 
diversity is indicative of the slavers’ common selection process. In his book The Slave 
Ship: A Human History, Marcus Rediker confirms that European and American slavers 
were conscious that West Africa is one of the world’s richest linguistic zones. Rediker 
goes on to cite the logs of William Simson and William Smith, who argued that “[t]he 
means used by those who trade to Guinea, to keep the Negros quiet, is to choose them 
from severall [sic] parts of ye Country, of different Languages” (qtd. in Rediker 276) and 
that, by taking some “of every sort aboard [the slave ship], there will be no more 
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Likelihood of their succeeding in a Plot, than of finishing the Tower of Babel” (qtd. in 
Rediker 276). In short, it was common practice for slavers to choose Africans from 
different locations and cultural groups along the continent’s western coast for the express 
purpose of preventing communication between them. All this is to say that language 
barriers clearly exist between many of the captives as well. This reality of the cargo hold 
was constructed according to the slavers’ design. Yet despite this obstacle, their black 
noise—their screams, shrieks, moans, ululations, and so on—still signifies viscerally and 
primordially among them. As sonic material, their singular voices are the agents of 
intrusive, affective exposure to each corresponding singular captive in that cargo hold. 
 Black noise voices the interruption that constitutes community as being-with. A 
striking example of this event occurs later in the narrative, after Mintah reveals herself to 
the other captives who had witnessed the crew throw her into the sea. Mintah’s 
miraculous survival leads the women to conjecture that “[t]he gods were present in her to 
watch over them” (D’Aguiar 93). Overjoyed, “[s]ome of the women began to clap and 
sing an improvised song in which they took turns to praise Mintah’s name”: 
‘Mintah is a god who walks among us as a woman.’ 
‘Aieee!’ Whistles, ululations, and rapid clapping which then slowed for 
the next encomium. 
‘A god has come as Mintah to save us from this sea.’ 
‘Aieee!’ More whistles and ululating and fast handclaps. 
‘The goddess Mintah will free this ship and guide it back to Africa.’ 
Aieees! Endless whistles, ceaseless ululations, clapping and clapping as if 
it were not conjecture but had come true. (93) 
 
In its improvised call and response style, the song is equally constituted both by each 
singer’s praises of Mintah and by the responders’ whistling, ululating, and clapping. 
Discursive communication—as in the singers’ praises—is not privileged over black 
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noise—as in the responders’ ‘aieees!’ D’Aguiar’s refusal to privilege the discursive 
dimension of the women’s voices in part evokes the multiplicity of languages spoken by 
the captives. Each singer’s encomium is translated for us by the narrator’s intermediation. 
Africans from different cultural groups would not have had the same assistance. For 
many of the women, the exact meaning of the singers’ praises would have remained 
opaque. For these women on the other side of a language barrier, their fellows’ 
encomiums are in excess of legibility—black noise.  
In spite of, or precisely because of, this, their song nonetheless eventually “spread 
through the women’s hold and stirred even the sick from their stupor,” becoming a 
soundscape (94). Indeed, Rediker notes that song was “one of the recurrent sounds of the 
slave ship” (Rediker 282). He goes on to write, “Song was an essential means of 
communication among people who were not meant to communicate…: singing in African 
languages permitted among the captives a kind of communication that many of the 
European captains and crew members could not understand” (282), describing the 
purposes of songs such as “finding one’s kind, fellow villagers, and countrymen and –
women….identifying which cultural groups were on board the ship” (282), 
“communicating important information about conditions, treatment, resistance, and 
events, about where the ship was going” (282-3), and, perhaps most importantly, 
“creating a common base of knowledge and forming a collective identity” (283). Of 
these, black noise relates most keenly to the last two: creating a common base of 
knowledge and forming a collective identity. Although each encomium’s legibility would 
have varied between each singular person in the Zong’s hold, the women nonetheless 
recognize that the song celebrates Mintah, a goddess they come to believe will save them 
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from the sea. In other words, it is the black noise of the improvised call and response that 
fashions Mintah into a goddess and a savior in the women’s collective imagination. 
 The willingness to respond varies significantly between captive and crew, 
however. Feeding the Ghosts opens with Captain Cunningham’s exhorting the crew to 
accept his scheme in order to turn their loss to profit. While he makes his murderous case 
before the crew, both the sounds of the open sea and the captives’ black noise go 
unacknowledged by them. Yet the narrator does acknowledge the black noise, thereby 
bringing it to our attentions:  
More than the wind in the sails and the sea against the sides or the strain in 
the ship’s timbers plummeting through water were the just audible cries 
emanating from below decks. But neither the captain nor the assembled 
crew seemed to hear them, or perhaps, like the sea, the ship and the sails, 
these cries had grown so habitual to the sailors’ ears, they were no longer 
heard as signals of distress, but as part of the whole, all-encompassing 
fabric of routine. (D’Aguiar 10). 
 
The everyday routine of the slave trade has seemingly deafened the sailors’ ears. Of note 
in this excerpt, however, is the way in which D’Aguiar still frames their cries as “signals 
of distress.” Rather, it is the sailors that have willfully deafened themselves to this 
immutable dimension of their cries. Although the other’s interruptive voice gives the 
imperative a sonic materiality that is most proper to its exigency, its call still leaves space 
for refusal or non-acknowledgment.  
At this point, a closer examination of the imperative is necessary. In the original 
French, the imperative recurs in the philosophies of Nancy and Derrida as the phrase Il 
faut, which translates to English as It is necessary. Crucial to note is the syntax’s 
arealization of the possibility for refusal: it is necessary, as in, it is necessary to breathe, 
or it is necessary to drink water. The emphasis must be placed on the event itself to 
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denote its necessity. Yet despite the fact that breathing and hydrating ourselves are 
essential to sustaining our lives, for instance, these realities of our existences does not 
prohibit the possibility that we may, at any time, resolve not to breathe (as long as we 
remain conscious, that is) or refuse to drink water. After all, asphyxiation and 
dehydration are possibilities. This is the perspective from which we ought to understand 
the exigency of the other’s voice. In other words, the other’s voice is always already 
calling us into responsibility. We do remain free, however, to refuse to acknowledge that 
call in an ethical fashion. Such is the case with the crew in D’Aguiar’s novel. It is not 
entirely that their overexposure to the captives’ cries has desensitized them to their 
dimension as signals of distress, but rather that their sustained refusal to acknowledge 
them as such has congealed over time into the banality of commodification. 
Yet the areality for refusal within the imperative does not neuter its exigency. 
When the ship suddenly shifts to starboards a short while later, the narrator observes, 
“Along with the creaking wood and some loose items crashing to the deck, shouts and 
screams climbed up the stairs leading from below and escaped through the barred hatches 
or else managed to squeeze through the grooves between the planks of the upper deck. A 
righted ship did nothing to quell them” (15). A few pages later, the narrator continues:  
When the slaves heard a complaint louder than their own they listened. 
Their voices had become detached from them, no longer reliant on the 
capacity of their lungs, adding to this big engine that powered itself and 
understood their countless reasons for giving it expression, and grew on 
this understanding into an independent force so powerful now it was 
capable of wrecking the vessel where it was born. (26) 
 
What is perhaps most arresting about D’Aguiar’s prose in these excerpts is the agency he 
affords the captives’ voices, which he describes in the first passage as performing actions 
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in the active voice. Their shouts and screams climb, escape, and squeeze. In the second 
excerpt, their voices sound out together, layering into a materially affective and 
independent force powerful enough to destroy the Zong itself. We ought to read the 
narrator’s description in this passage both literally and figuratively. The captives express 
their anger and distress sonically because it is nearly their only recourse. Shackled below 
decks in the cargo hold, they are forced to inhabit “a confined hole where to twist a little 
encumbered another, where elbows on each side speared into ribs and sleep was light, 
patchy, eyes wide, fitful, snatched, troubled, whimpering” (26-7). Cramped physical 
confinement renders other, more physical expressions of anger or distress either 
impossible or painful to their fellows. However, the fact remains that the captives 
outnumber the crew. If they were to get free and act together, they could overwhelm the 
crew and destroy the Zong—which nearly does occur at the close of the novel’s first 
section. The captives’ voices are therefore both literal and metonymic embodiments of 
their shared indignation. 
Proximity and distance are crucial spatial considerations for us to consider in any 
phenomenology of the slave ship, but particularly this phenomenology of the Zong. In the 
cargo hold, the captives are constantly and intrusively forced into visceral contact with 
each other’s bodies and effluvia. The “hot stench” of the cargo hold, in its “stale, airless 
confinement,” is rank with “sweat from bodies that had not been allowed to wash for 
days,” “the accident of vomit from the sick, urine from those chained for such 
inordinately long spells,” and “faeces” (19). Although the captives’ cries are only “just 
audible” to the crew on deck, the crew are free from the embodied immersion in the 
cargo hold that the captives were forced to endure. Tellingly, the crew cannot tolerate the 
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atmosphere of the hold, which is “too rank for the toughest constitution among them” 
(19). Disgustingly, “Kelsal saw the Africans’ continued survival under such adverse 
circumstances as evidence of their suitability for a life of unremitting toil” (19). I would 
submit that the captives’ forced proximity strangles the areality within the imperative for 
refusal while the crew’s privileged distance from their captives enables their 
impoverished, commodifying reasoning. While the crew must occasionally enter the 
cargo hold to tend to their captives, the hold they have engineered10 is a material context 
that, not coincidentally, inhibits acknowledgment. When Kelsal descends into the cargo 
hold to select captives to jettison into the sea, the narrator accounts for his experience: 
Howls, moans, cries, calls, and implorings in indecipherable tongues 
assailed Kelsal’s ears. He held his lantern forward into the dreary space to 
pick out lame from able-bodied but could not distinguish between man 
and man. A sea of eyes, flesh welded into one body of complaints, on 
occasion separating into distinct entities of mankind, but mostly 
indistinguishable from another as anything but a sound, a movement, a 
plea inscribed on some face momentarily by a lamp, before melting back 
into the thick dark. (19) 
 
Most noteworthy for our purposes is, once again, D’Aguiar’s use—or, in this case, his 
omission of—the active voice, particularly in the phrase “a sound, a movement, a plea 
inscribed on some face momentarily by a lamp.” From Kelsal’s perspective, it is the lamp 
that (passively) inscribes sound, movement, or plea onto the captives’ faces. Or rather, 
the sound, movement, and plea do not belong most properly to the captives’ faces; they 
                                                      
10 “Engineered” not in the sense that European architects designed these slave ships, nor solely in the sense 
that the Zong’s crew, aware as they were of the ship’s material constraints, opted to kidnap 470 Africans in 
a space designed to hold less than half their number. Rather, “engineered” in the sense that the hold’s 
unimaginably unsanitary condition is the direct consequence of the crew’s failure to maintain proper 
sanitary conditions: “the fact that if at one of the day’s two meals adults and children had not used the 
buckets allocated to them for human waste, for…just sheer lack of opportunity (before the orders and rough 
treatment resumed as their jailers sought to fasten them to their chains and bolts in record time so that they 
themselves could escape an atmosphere too rank for the toughest among them), then they were left to stew 
in their faeces” (D’Aguiar 19). 
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are a property of the light issued forth by Kelsal’s lamp. There is no space within his 
perspective to recognize the captives’ singularities: each instant of singularity flashes by, 
briefly illumined by the lamp. By extension, it is the movement of Kelsal’s arm holding 
the lamp that commits the inscription and subsequent erasure as the face, movement, 
plea, sound vanishes back into the darkness. 
The crew’s refusal to recognize the voices and singularities of the enslaved speaks 
to an ontological or relational coldness, deficiency, or impoverishment in their own 
subjectivities instead of a disempowerment of the captives’ interruptive voices. For a 
crew so accustomed to commodification, a much starker encounter is required to interrupt 
their routine. 
Fittingly, it is an encounter with a figure out of his past, Mintah, which unsettles 
Kelsal. When she realizes what Kelsal and the crew are doing to her fellows, Mintah feels 
compelled to act: “My voice has to compete with the wind as it blunts the pointed parts of 
the ship,” she wrote, “and with the sea trying to chop the hull in two, and with the tap-
tap-tapping of the rain testing the deck for any signs of weakness. My voice finds a way 
through all three. ‘Kelsal’” (185)! Later, at the very moment that she makes eye contact 
with Kelsal, Mintah apprehends her duty. She recounts, “They come for me with a 
lantern that cannot burn in this bad air. They hit me in the dark and drag me out. He looks 
at me and I see a fire in his eyes that makes those eyes strange to me. I see he is confused 
by my use of his name. He is running wild. I have to stop him. How else than by calling 
him” (185)? By taking the form of his name to which his ears are instinctively attuned, 
Mintah’s call disruptively forces Kelsal to acknowledge her,(25). When the encounter is 
played out from Kelsal’s perspective, the language D’Aguiar employs to describe it 
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changes drastically: “He passed his club behind him and thrust his lantern into the face of 
a woman to his left. She stared up at him and said accusingly, ‘Kelsal!’ Her eyes were 
wet. She bared her teeth at him. Kelsal’s lantern dimmed and went out due to lack of 
air…. Her large eyes glistened as if they retained the flame of his failed lamp” (28-9). In 
the active voice, the narrator writes that Mintah stared, that Mintah said Kelsal’s name 
accusingly, that Mintah bared her teeth, that Mintah’s large eyes glistened with the light. 
With his prose, D’Aguiar accounts for Mintah’s singularity, agency, and embodiedness. 
However, it is crucial to note that this encounter plays out from Kelsal’s impoverished 
perspective. It is Mintah’s dogged insistence of calling his name, accusingly and 
reproachfully, that disrupts Kelsal’s banal, commodifying gaze and forces him to 
respond. 
The central tension between Mintah and Kelsal plays out throughout the novel, 
but stems from a period of time in which Kelsal, afflicted by yellow fever and marooned 
on the West African coastline, convalesced at the Dutch Christian mission where Mintah 
grew up. Immediately prior to his decision to throw her overboard for insubordination, 
Mintah furiously reminds Kelsal who she is, how she nursed him back to health, and the 
condition from which Mintah helped rescue Kelsal from: 
‘Kelsal!’ He looks at me and grits his teeth. He comes to me. I tell him I 
know him from his days as a thief at the mission when he had to work for 
his freedom and he did not know his name and had to be told who he was 
time and time again. How he said it like a word that was new in the 
language. Not a name that belonged to him. How he had to grow to like 
that name again. Not having to look around expecting another person to 
reply when it was called. Not waiting for it to be called twice before 
realising it was his name and responding to it with surprise in his voice. 
To hear it the first time and, without a gap between the name and his 
thoughts because he inhabited it, be on his way. (187) 
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When Mintah’s written testimony surfaces in court later, her figured voice disrupts and 
unsettles Kelsal once again. It is at this point in the narrative that Kelsal’s cruelty toward 
Mintah is explained from his own perspective for the first time. As he struggles to 
determine how he ought to account for her in his testimony, Kelsal “wasn’t sure what to 
say. Should he tell the court that Mintah made him drink when was at the fort and 
delirious with fever? That she was among the young women keeping vigil over him and 
mopping the sweat from him during his interminable nights he woke up not knowing his 
name and had to be told by her, ‘Kelsal. Kelsal’? That he had to repeat it to himself until 
it rang true” (157-8)? 
 Kelsal’s time at the fort is characterized by his namelessness, complete 
dependence on the kindness of young women like Mintah, and indebtedness to the 
mission. “He was always free to leave,” Mintah recalls in her testimony, “but not before 
he had repaid a little of the time everyone had devoted to him when he was ill and had to 
be nursed” (195). Mintah’s presence aboard the Zong and the existence of her testimony 
at the trial two years later remind Kelsal that he is not, in fact, an immanent being or an 
individual, radically separate from the Africans he now makes a living enslaving and 
brutalizing. As such, it is this reminder that rings in Kelsal’s ears whenever Mintah 
speaks, says his name, or reminds him of his indebtedness to her. Her status as a witness 
at his hour of debility—an hour he has attempted to erase from his memory by remaking 
himself as a competent first mate—drives him to repay her compassion with murderous 
violence. To Kelsal, Mintah’s voice is an agent of his weakness, his shame. 
Ironically, Kelsal’s episode of debilitated namelessness at the mission mimes the 
violence of enslavement that he perpetrates upon Mintah and her fellow captives. Being 
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jettisoned into the sea dissociates Mintah from her body. In D’Aguiar’s prose, her 
dissociation is framed as both a psychological response to trauma and a lucid and incisive 
reflection on the material violence of that enslavement has committed upon her body: 
My body already belongs to the sea. Salt rubs itself all over it. My body 
belongs to the Zong. Wood presses its print wherever I lie. And the captain 
of the Zong. He has marked me in a ledger as his. Kelsal too thinks I 
belong to him. He tried to stake his claim. The crew know they can do 
whatever they please with it since it is theirs too before it is mine. My 
body belongs to everyone but me. I move in it like a thief. I do not belong 
to it. All this journey it is trying to separate itself from me, to be rid of me 
once and for all. My body seems to think that if it dies it will kill me, the 
intruder in it.  
I am trying to get it back it back to land. I know that on land my body will 
recognise me again as part of it. The sea has come between my body and 
me. The Zong too. The captain and his crew. They have made me a 
stranger in my body. My name does not match my body anymore. (200) 
 
Enslavement functions by dispossessing the captive of their bodily autonomy. A slave is 
kidnapped from their homeland, forced down into the cargo hold of the slave ship with 
their fellows, displaced across the Middle Passage, and sold into debilitating and 
interminable labor for the rest of their natural life. A slave is raped, impregnated, and 
separated from their partners and children at the masters’ discretion. The psychological 
aftereffects of Kelsal’s illness may resemble the wounds that the brutalities of 
enslavement have inflicted upon Mintah and her fellows, but it is a purposefully anemic 
resemblance at best. Whereas white brutality characterizes and defines the condition of 
enslavement, hospitality and the exigency of reciprocity nursed Kelsal back to health and 
haunt him still. As such, Kelsal is detestable for his inability to respond to Mintah’s past 
kindness and current pleas with anything but violence, yes, but he is also pathetic in that 
he cannot recognize that his debility is wholly incommensurate with the violence he and 
the crew commit upon their captives. 
 41 
For the crew’s captives, the possibility for resistance endures all the same and 
echoes in the voices, songs, and black noise of the captives—but the trauma of bodily 
dispossession carries its material consequences. As additive archival representation, 
Feeding the Ghosts bears witness to both. 
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Section 3: 
Material Responses: Voice, Song, and Pure Utterance  
One of the most well-known literary-archival interventions is arguably Toni 
Morrison’s Beloved, for which she was famously awarded the 1993 Nobel Prize in 
Literature. Novelistic form and situatedness in a post-Emancipation U.S. context 
notwithstanding, what is of interest to us about Beloved is its invocation of an extra-
discursive, material soundscape. By first examining this literary soundscape in Morrison, 
then moving on to a reading of M. NourbeSe Philip’s Zong!, our aim is to highlight  
Near the close of Beloved, thirty townswomen gather outside the house of Sethe, 
an ex-slave woman who years earlier chose to slit her infant daughter’s throat rather than 
allow her to be re-enslaved. Haunted by her baby girl’s ghost since that day, Sethe has 
recently been visited by and taken in a young woman calling herself Beloved—a being 
who not only embodies the baby’s ghost, but also the “Sixty Million and more” 
disremembered and unaccounted for victims of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Sethe’s 
recognition and claim of Beloved as her dead daughter—and Beloved’s reciprocal claim 
of Sethe as hers—has impelled Sethe to abandon her employment to spend every waking 
hour both fulfilling Beloved’s increasingly angry demands and attempting to explain why 
her murder was necessary. It is Sethe’s surviving daughter Denver who ventures into the 
community seeking help, and it is in response to Denver’s desperation that thirty 
townswomen gather to confront the ghost and rescue Sethe. 
When the townswomen first arrive, half of them drop to their knees in prayer. The 
others stand “holding [the house] in a fixed glare…trying to see through the walls, behind 
the door, to what was really in there” (Morrison 304-5). One of these women, Ella, is 
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reminded of her own experiences by Sethe’s situation, imagines the “hairy white thing,” 
implied to be the product of rape, that she “delivered, but would not nurse…coming back 
to whip her too,” and she hollers (305). “Instantly the kneelers and the standers joined 
her,” narrates Morrison. “They stopped praying and took a step back to the beginning. In 
the beginning there were no words. In the beginning was the sound, and they all knew 
what that sound sounded like” (305). Together, the thirty townswomen sing, shout, 
holler, ululate—their voices searching “for the right combination, the key, the code, the 
sound that broke the back of words. Building voice upon voice until they found it, and 
when they did it was a wave of sound wide enough to sound deep water and knock the 
pods off chestnut trees” (308). Together, the thirty townswomen harmonize, invoke, and 
recreate the primordial “sound that broke the back of words” and ultimately drives 
Beloved to disappear. 
That phrase of Morrison’s—“sound that broke the back of words”—warrants 
closer attention. As Ana Luszczynska observes in The Ethics of Community: Nancy, 
Derrida, Morrison and Menendez, to break the back of a word is to compromise its 
ability to support stable discursive signification, which is a concept that the ex-slave 
characters are justifiably ambivalent and wary toward (Luszczynska 89). Earlier in the 
novel Morrison problematizes this concept of definition through an encounter between 
Sixo, an enslaved man, and schoolteacher, his owner. When schoolteacher accuses him of 
stealing a shoat, Sixo invokes the rhetoric of capital to argue that he killed, butchered, 
and ate the shoat to improve his own productivity as schoolteacher’s slave. Ergo, by 
feeding—or investing in—himself, Sixo has improved schoolteacher’s property the same 
way he “take and feed the soil, [to] give you more crop” (Morrison 224). Sixo reframes 
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his theft as a utilitarian concern for the plantation’s productivity and schoolteacher’s 
economic investment. But while Sixo’s argument is clever, “schoolteacher beat him 
anyway to show him that definitions belonged to the definer—not the defined” (225). 
Although Sixo is willing to rhetorically concede his personhood by referring to himself as 
chattel, schoolteacher retains the legal right to beat Sixo for his so-called presumption. 
Schoolteacher’s power as “the (white) definer” of words prohibits any discursive 
reinterpretation by Sixo, “the (black) defined.” For Morrison and Sixo, the problem with 
definition is that it is a function of power predicated on race. In the American English of 
the mid-nineteenth century, definition belongs exclusively to the white man. Crucial to 
note is that English’s hostility to breeding possible futures for black people is a direct 
result of the definitional stranglehold that whites exert on language. In English, there was 
little room for black people to reinterpret, redefine, reinvent, or represent themselves or 
the world they live in. Is it any wonder, then, that Sixo ultimately “stopped speaking 
English because there was no future in it” (30)?  
From this perspective, to break the back of a word is a liberating act. Unlike 
Sixo’s clever argument, the thirty townswomen’s sound is not discursive. That said, it is 
not a denial of language either. In other words, the thirty townswomen do not rhetorically 
subvert the capitalistic logic of slavery, nor does their sound signify a refusal to engage 
with the language altogether; rather, they utterly break the word’s capacity to carry or 
convey definition. As Luszczynska notes, “The sound does not indicate an articulation of 
a message or idea. Although the sound breaks signifying meaning, it is, nonetheless (or 
consequently more), meaningful, as it can ‘knock the pods off chestnut trees’ and causes 
Sethe to ‘tremble like the baptized in its wash’” (Luszczynska 89). In her reading of this 
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scene, Luszczynska underscores the radically interdependent, extended, and 
“meaninglessly meaningful” nature of the townswomen’s song. Observing that the 
townswomen’s voices are “configured as dependent on one another for the creation of 
this immensely powerful sound” (88) and “singing to or toward Sethe and Beloved” in 
such a way that “[t]hey receive neither response nor verification of the sound’s reception” 
(89), Luszczynska obviates the sonic materiality of the singular voice. Again, this is to 
say that a voice is simultaneously singular—singularly of a single, unique singular 
being—and intrinsically toward, indelibly communicative. Before the spoken word 
becomes a word or speech-act, it is constituted by sound.11 As sound, a voice spaces itself 
out from the singular being to whom it belongs and into the surrounding environment. As 
such, the possibility that this voice may be heard by another capable of listening always 
already exists. A speaker’s discursive intentionality is not necessarily clear to their 
listeners, nor is discursive intentionality necessarily more “meaningful” than the 
nondiscursive dimension, or sound. This is because voice is, primordially, sound. We 
cannot preempt or override its nondiscursive dimension, because this sonic materiality is 
what constitutes voice as voice. 
The event which transpires between the thirty singing townswomen, Sethe, and 
Beloved turns on acknowledgment. There is the townswomen’s acknowledgment that the 
sound is radically prior to words. There is also their acknowledgment of their 
interdependence, their need to sing together to find the sound. By singing to and toward 
Sethe and Beloved, however, the townswomen must also acknowledge them in and 
                                                      
11 Similarly, before the written word is a word, it is constituted by inscription—the material mark made 
upon the surface.  
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through rescue and confrontation. The thirty townswomen create a soundscape for and 
toward Sethe and Beloved that redeems the former of the latter through acknowledgment. 
Together, they create a soundscape—a soundscape that has the material presence to 
occupy the space of a “wave.” As a wave, it is in part a soundscape that functions as a 
material acknowledgment of Beloved and the disremembered and unnamable dead she 
represents.  
Yet theirs is a particular sort of acknowledgment. Earlier in the novel, Beloved 
exhorts Sethe’s companion Paul D to “touch me on the inside part and call me my name,” 
promising him, “I’ll go if you call it” (Morrison 137). Despite the fact that Paul D calls 
her “Beloved,” she does not go, implying that Beloved is not in fact her name. Indeed, 
Sethe never named her baby girl before or after she slit her throat. As Morrison writes in 
the novel’s epilogue, “Everybody knew what she was called, but nobody anywhere knew 
her name. Disremembered and unaccounted for, she cannot be lost because no one is 
looking for her, and even if they were, how can they call her if they don’t know her 
name? Although she has claim, she is not claimed” (323). The utter ineffability of 
Beloved’s name—impossible to know because she never received one; ergo, her name 
does not exist—also stands metonymically for the “Sixty Million and more” whose 
names we can never recover, know, or speak. In this mode, acknowledgment is 
impossible. The living cannot bestow their names with the acknowledgment of sonic 
materiality; we cannot speak their names and make the air of this world shake with the 
vibration of each syllable. Recognizing the impossibility for what it is, the thirty 
townswomen acknowledge Beloved with the “meaninglessly meaningful” soundscape. 
And Beloved goes. 
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Although Sethe and Denver are expiated of Beloved by the townswomen’s 
soundscape and eventually forget her like a bad dream, Beloved lingers at and after the 
novel’s close, trace-like, in non-corporeal form. Her haunting manifests in “the rustle of a 
skirt [which] hushes when they wake,” “knuckles brushing a cheek in sleep,” a shifting 
“photograph…looked at too long,” and “her footprints [which] come and go, come and 
go” (324). As readers we are to understand that Sethe’s obsessive devotion to her dead 
daughter left no room for her to create a future, that Sethe’s desperate attempts to 
convince Beloved that her murder was both justified and necessary must have failed 
because Sethe’s (discursive) rationale are incommensurate with the (material, 
nondiscursive, radically irrecuperable) acts and experiences of killing, dying, and death. 
From this, we are to infer that it is impossible to make the disremembered dead “go” 
permanently. The work of mourning is interminable. 
However, Morrison’s epilogue leaves space for sympathy and continued 
responsibility toward and for Beloved: 
Down by the stream in back of 124, her footprints come and go, come and 
go. They are so familiar. Should a child, an adult place his feet in them, 
they will fit. Take them out and they disappear again as though nobody 
ever walked there.  
By and by all trace is gone, and what is forgotten is not only the footprints 
but the water too and what is down there. The rest is weather. Not the 
breath of the disremembered and unaccounted for, but wind in the eaves, 
or spring ice thawing too quickly. Just weather. Certainly no clamor for a 
kiss. 
Beloved. (324) 
 
My reasons for beginning this section with these scenes from Beloved are that, in my 
view, they are singularly illustrative of the questions we have been thematizing in this 
study: the imperative to bear witness, the dilemmas of representation, and the sonic 
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materiality of voice as acknowledgment. The climactic scene in which thirty 
townswomen sing together and create a soundscape for the unnamable dead is, in a very 
powerful sense, an antecedent for M. NourbeSe Philip’s Zong! 
For Zong! is premised on recognition that the “Sixty Million and more” that 
Beloved represents in the novel still linger in our world. These are the specters that, as we 
have read in the previous section on Fred D’Aguiar’s Feeding the Ghosts, Mintah devotes 
her life to feeding, for they are hungry for stories of themselves. With Zong!, NourbeSe 
places her feet into Beloved’s footsteps. For Zong! and the massacre its text bears witness 
to, these footprints—the only remaining trace—is the two-page legal text of Gregson v. 
Gilbert. 
But it is water that bridges Morrison’s and NourbeSe’s texts together. When 
Morrison writes, “By and by all trace is gone, and what is forgotten is not only the 
footsteps but the water too and what is down there,” she gestures toward the material 
remains of the enslaved who we know to have been drowned by those waters—the “Sixty 
Million and more” to whom Beloved (324). It is in an attempt to remember “the water 
and what is down there” that NourbeSe attempts to do the work of recovering, 
reclaiming, or exhuming those bodies from their liquid graves. The term NourbeSe uses 
to describe this process is exaqua: that is, to exhume the bodies of the Zong’s victims 
from the water. In lieu of the enslaved’s literal, material remains—their scoured bones—
Zong! orients itself toward creating a textual space where their voices may sound out. 
When we have observed that a voice is singular, this observation has rested on the 
embodiedness of our voices. As sound, our voices are constituted by the materialities of 
our bodies that produces them, thereby carrying something of our bodies outside of 
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ourselves and spacing it out into the material world. For NourbeSe, then, Zong! as a 
material object is like the surface from which the sound of the captives’ voices reemerge. 
Zong! is a collection of found poetry, which is to say that NourbeSe constructs her 
poetry using only the meagre words present in the legal decision. Structurally, the poetic 
text of Zong! is divided into six sections: Os, Sal, Ventus, Ratio, Ferrum, and Ebora. All 
six of these names are Latin words; the third, however, is also a word in Afrikaans while 
the last is also a Yoruba word. Os translates to bones, which resonates with NourbeSe’s 
impossible intention, apropos of Derrida in Specters of Marx, to locate the material 
remains of the drowned. “I want the bones,” NourbeSe tells Patricia Saunders during an 
interview in 2008. “‘Give me the bones,’ I say to the silence that is so often what history 
presents us. And again, because that space of memory and of the archive where you come 
up against their inherent limitations can become a space of craziness, the bones actually 
ground you.” (Saunders 68-9). Sal translates to salt in Latin and will in Afrikaans. 
Together with the following section entitled Ventus, which translates to wind, these two 
sections together most likely refer to the Zong’s literal voyage across the Middle Passage. 
The fourth section’s title, Ratio, translates to reason. According to Alessandro Corio in 
his article “Annagrams of annihilation: The (im)possible writing of the middle passage in 
NourbeSe Philip and Édouard Glissant,” the Latin Ratio also alludes “to the legal 
language, where ratio decidendi indicates the central reason for a legal decision” (Corio 
337). Ferrum translates to iron, evoking the balls and chains—or, literally, irons—that 
the captives would have been forced into after capture. In Latin, Ebora means ivory; in 
Yoruba, it translates to haunted. These sections comprise a sort of textual arc, but not a 
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linear progression. Unlike Feeding the Ghosts or Beloved, there is no inherent narrative 
structuring Zong!. 
The translational ambivalence which haunts the section titles—as in, “Which 
language should we prioritize when reading considering Sal and Ebora: Latin, Afrikaans, 
or Yoruba?”—speaks to an underlying multilingual potential in Zong!’s poetic text. In the 
“Glossary: Words and Phrases Overheard on Board the Zong,” NourbeSe accounts for 
words from fourteen different languages other than the original English of the legal text 
appearing in the poetic text (Philip 183-4). These languages include, but are not 
necessarily limited to, Arabic, Dutch, Fon, French, Greek, Hebrew, Italian, Latin, 
Portuguese, Spanish, Shona, Twi, West African Patois, and Yoruba. I emphasize “not 
necessarily limited to” here because the poetic text, by its very fragmented nature, may 
potentially be read in such a way that a reader could uncover a word in another language. 
That is to say, a multilingual reader who is conversant in another language other than the 
fourteen that NourbeSe accounts for in the glossary may locate a word in a language that 
other readers, including NourbeSe, may not have read or written for. 
Rearranging the words and letters throughout the pages of her text, NourbeSe 
creates fragmented poetry. These fragments, however, are not solely to be parsed for new 
discursive significations—although it is possible to form new, if necessarily halting, 
syntactical units by reading the fragments together. In “Notanda,” her explanatory 
epilogue to the poetry, NourbeSe explains, “Zong! bears witness to the ‘resurfacing of the 
drowned and the oppressed’ and transforms the dessicated, legal report into a cacophony 
of voices—wails, cries, moans, and shouts that had earlier been banned from the text” 
(Philip 203). Later in the epilogue, NourbeSe goes on to declare, “Why the exclamation 
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point after Zong!? Zong! is chant! Shout! And ululation! Zong! is moan! Mutter! Howl! 
And shriek! Zong! is ‘pure utterance.’ Zong! is Song” (206)!  
Most striking about NourbeSe’s arrangement of the fissured syllables is their stark 
juxtaposition against the blank, white page, especially in the earlier sections of the poetic 
text. In Os and Sal, the first two sections of the poetic text, the sparse quantity and 
clustered formation of words on the page makes for a sharper juxtaposition of black text 
on white page. In the final section Ebora, however, the poetic text is nearly unreadable. 
Not only have pieces of text overlapped as palimpsests, but the inscriptions themselves 
are fainter, almost as though the printer that produced the book had been low on ink. 
From the perspective of a phenomenological soundscape of the Zong, however, Ebora in 
particular is striking to read as either the murmurings of hungry specters or the actual 
drownings of the captives thrown overboard, as their voices are waterlogged. The 
drownings, in fact, haunt Zong!. As a simultaneously sonic and aesthetic text, Zong! is 
inextricably co-constituted by and exists at the intersection of these dimensions. That is to 
say, NourbeSe does grant the fragments a textuality as poetry, printed on the page, that is 
comparable to the textuality of the legal text. However, once spoken aloud, the fragments 
gain sonic materiality. If Zong! is wail, moan, cry, ululation, shout, shriek, howl—and, 
indeed, pure utterance—then it follows that the poems should be read aloud: not 
necessarily to uncover new meanings, but to give voice to them. The violent 
rearrangement NourbeSe commits upon the language, rationale, and grammar of the legal 
text not only mimes the violence committed upon the captives aboard the Zong by 
recreating a phenomenological soundscape of the slave ship, but also creates the space 
necessary on the page for the possibility of a voice to sound out. 
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Conducive to a reading of Zong! as a sound-based recreation of the slave ship is 
the question of co-authorship. NourbeSe credits someone named Setaey Adamu Boateng 
as her coauthor. In the authors’ blurb on the book’s back cover, the following is written 
about Boateng: “Setaey Adamu Boateng is the voice of the ancestors revealing 
submerged stories of all who were on board the Zong” (Philip). In her acknowledgments, 
NourbeSe writes, “I thank the Ancestors for bestowing the responsibility of work on me. 
Àse” (xii). There are two crucial points we will trace: the question of co-authorship and 
the word àse. First, the question. If Boateng is the voice of the ancestors—possibly even 
including those ancestors who were thrown overboard by Zong’s crew12—then they very 
well could disclose the phenomenological experience on board the Zong for NourbeSe to 
transcribe. As such, Zong! may be read not only as additive archival representation, but 
testimony that counts as a primary source, archival representation. Of course, this kind of 
reading would necessitate a suspension of disbelief that more skeptical readers may 
refuse to entertain, as is their right. That said, the possibility remains for readers to 
explore, as we have here. 
Second, the word. Àse, or àshe, is a Yoruba word. Art historian Robert Farris 
Thompson claims that àse literally means “‘So be it,’ ‘May it happen’” and signifies in 
Yoruba culture as “divine force incarnate” (Thompson 7). According to Heather Russell:  
In West African philosophy, the highest achievement of art is àshe, and 
                                                      
12 Common sense seemingly dictates that NourbeSe’s ancestors could not have numbered among the 
drowned precisely because she exists and is living now. Had one of her ancestors been murdered aboard 
Zong, then it follows that NourbeSe herself would never have been born. Apropos of that same line of 
thought as presented to her by an Ewe elder, however, NourbeSe writes, “A full year later, on recounting 
the comment to my daughter, she responds to his comment: ‘Only if those who were thrown overboard left 
no offspring on board the Zong.’ Once again I am startled. I am startled at how we, that old man and I, so 
easily forgot the ‘meagre’ ones—the children” (Philip 202). Ergo, it is entirely possible—if admittedly 
improbable—that one of NourbeSe’s ancestors was drowned by the crew on board the Zong. 
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when ascribed to a composition or performance, the resultant creation is 
contended to have all prescribed boundaries of form. As a consequence, 
art that achieves àshe would naturally defy conventional dictates; it would 
break down familiar/conventional/generic constructs, such as those 
governing fact, fiction, truth, reality, myth, history, nation, imagination, 
and narratology. It would fall ‘beyond a boundary’ of Eurocentric 
epistemology and aesthetics. The power of ashe, then, lies in its 
transcendent ability to cross the borders and boundaries of fixed constructs 
regarding knowledge, interpretation, and apprehension as well as the 
formal structures framing such hermeneutical engagement. (Russell 10-1) 
 
Supposing that NourbeSe’s invocation of àse signals her and Boateng’s intention to 
create a text that transcends all conventional and Eurocentric prescription vis-à-vis form, 
epistemology, and aesthetics, then reading Zong! as a text that, perhaps, has achieved áse 
retraces the observations we have been making about the text. Indeed, as pure utterance, 
Zong! may also be said to inscribe pure possibility. Examples such as the aforementioned 
multilingual readability constitute an especially evocative example of this pure 
possibility. Another is the paratext of West African surnames that runs along the bottom 
of the pages in Os. NourbeSe never explains why she adds this paratext in the “Notanda,” 
but it can be read as a litany of possibility: there is no way to say for sure if any of these 
names belong to the drowned and murdered aboard the Zong, but there remains a 
possibility that they may have belonged to some or at least one of the captives. Fittingly, 
it is by reading horizontally left-to-right and right-to-left, vertically top-to-bottom or 
bottom-to-top, or in any lateral, zig-zagging direction across the page that we may 
uncover new combinations of sound—pure possibility. That is to say, is it not possible 
that some combination of sounds read from the pages of Zong! may cohere into the name 
of a drowned captive, or even some of the sounds they uttered? 
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Like the thirty townswomen in Beloved, Zong! in its entirety does the work of 
soundscape as acknowledgment: by giving it voice, we acknowledge the disremembered 
dead the only way we can.  
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Conclusion: 
Living in the Afterlife of Slavery 
 My thesis was written in recognition that the Zong massacre is hardly past. The 
lives of the 470 kidnapped Africans who were transported across or thrown overboard to 
drown in the waters of the Middle Passage remain relevant to our contemporary political, 
social, and cultural contentions with race. In other words, we have not arrived at our 
present moment here in the United States, with the extrajudicial murder of black people 
and prison industrial complex, or in the postcolonial Caribbean nations, with the 
Caribbean Community’s (CARICOM) action plan for reparations from their former 
colonizers and enslavers, from out of nowhere. In “Venus in Two Acts,” Saidiya Hartman 
observes that we live in the “afterlife of slavery” or “afterlife of property,” which she 
describes as “the detritus of lives with which we have yet to attend, a past that has yet to 
be done, and the ongoing state of emergency in which black life remains in peril” 
(“Venus in Two Acts” 13). We have inherited a past that is constituted by the experiences 
of our forebearers. By writing this thesis, I intended to create a work which acknowledges 
the drowned and disremembered dead of the Zong and attempts to listen for the 
resurfacing of their voices in order to underscore both the unfinished, endless work of 
mourning their deaths and the intractable connection of their deaths and the endless task 
of mourning/listening for their disremembered voices with our contemporary moment. I 
believe that it is only by acknowledging the past ethically that we can recognize the 
methods by which to bring an end to the legacies of enslavement. In the same gesture, I 
want to stress that to do so ethically hinges entirely on our willingness and ability to 
listen to the voices of those peoples and communities most affected by the legacies of 
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enslavement and to listen for, as we have spent these 50-some pages attempting, the 
voices of the dead. 
Where this thesis concludes, we must take up another point of departure—and go 
further. 
  
 57 
Bibliography 
Austen, Veronica J. “Zong!’s ‘Should we?’: Questioning the Ethical Representation of 
Trauma.” English Studies in Canada, vol. 37, no. 3-4, 2008, pp. 61-81. 
 
Corio, Alessandro. “Anagrams of annihilation: The (im)possible writing of the middle 
passage in NourbeSe Philip and Édouard Glissant.” International Journal of 
Francophone Studies, vol. 17, no. 3-4, 2014, pp. 445-68. 
 
D’Aguiar, Fred. Feeding the Ghosts. Waveland Press, 2015. 
 
Derrida, Jacques. Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression. University of Chicago Press, 
1996. 
 
Gilbert-Walsh, James. “Broken Imperatives: The Ethical Dimension of Nancy’s 
Thought.” Philosophy & Social Criticism, vol. 26, no. 2, 2000, pp. 29-50. 
 
Glissant, Édouard. Caribbean Discourse: Selected Essays. University of Virginia Press, 
1989. 
 
Hartman, Saidiya. Lose Your Mother: A Journey Along the Atlantic Slave Route. Farrar, 
Strauss and Giroux, 2007. 
 
---. “Venus in Two Acts.” Small Axe, vol. 12, no. 2, 2008, pp. 1-14. 
 
Johnson, Barbara. “Translator’s Introduction.” Dissemination, by Jacques Derrida, 
University of Chicago Press, 1981. 
 
Lacoue-Labarthe, Phillippe, and Jean-Luc Nancy. Retreating the Political. Routledge, 
2005. 
 
Lowe, Lisa. The Intimacies of Four Continents. Duke University Press, 2015. 
 
Luszczynska, Ana M. The Ethics of Community: Nancy, Derrida, Morrison, and 
Menendez. Bloomsbury, 2011. 
 
Mbembe, Achille. “The Power of the Archive and Its Limits.” Refiguring the Archive, 
edited by Carolyn Hamilton, Verne Harris, Jane Taylor, Michele Pickover, 
Graeme Reed, and Razia Saleh, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002. 
 
Morrison, Toni. Beloved. Vintage International, 2004. 
 
Nancy, Jean-Luc. The Inoperative Community. University of Minnesota Press, 1991. 
 
Philip, M. NourbeSe. Zong! Wesleyan University Press, 2008. 
 58 
 
Rediker, Marcus. The Slave Ship: A Human History. Penguin Books, 2007. 
 
Russell, Heather. Legba’s Crossing: Narratology in the African Atlantic. The University 
of Georgia Press, 2009. 
 
Saunders, Patricia. “Defending the Dead, Confronting the Archive: A Conversation with 
M. NourbeSe Philip.” Small Axe, vol. 12, no. 2, 2008, pp. 63-79. 
 
Schwartz, Joan M., and Terry Cook. “Archives, Records, and Power: The Making of 
Modern Memory.” Archival Science, vol. 2, 2002, pp. 1-19. 
 
Starn, Randolph. “Truths in the Archives.” Common Knowledge, vol. 8, no. 2, 2002, pp. 
387-401. 
 
Thompson, Robert Farris. Flash of the Spirit: African and Afro-American Art and 
Philosophy. Vintage Books, 1984. 
 
Wood, David. The Step Back: Ethics and Politics after Deconstruction. SUNY Press, 
2012. 
 
